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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : 
TIMOTHY G. GARCIA, : Case No. 930104-CA 
Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
INTRODUCTION 
Defendant/Appellant Timothy G. Garcia relies on his opening 
brief and also refers to that brief for the statements of 
jurisdiction, the issues, the case, and the facts. Appellant 
replies to the State's brief as follows. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The Utah Supreme Court's decision, State v. Depaoli, 835 
P.2d 162 (Utah 1992), governs the issue in this appeal. The Depaoli 
opinion held that "[s]ince expenses incurred by the prosecution for 
investigators are not allowed, it logically follows that costs of 
investigation would likewise be ineligible for restitution." Id. 
at 165. Investigative expenses such as the "code R" examination 
incurred by police in the Depaoli rape case are not recoverable 
because the cost "was incurred by the prosecution in the course of 
the investigation and prior to the time of the filing of the 
criminal information." Id. The same type of nonrecoverable 
investigative expense was incurred here in the undercover "sting" 
operation. A contrary determination by the Oregon court of appeals 
does not control the case at bar, as the analysis from the other 
jurisdiction neither fully recognizes its own law nor the statutory 
differences in Utah. 
ARGUMENT 
COSTS OF INVESTIGATION AND PROSECUTION ARE NOT 
RECOVERABLE UNDER THE RESTITUTION OR THE DEFENSE 
COSTS STATUTES 
In its brief, the State argues that State v. Depaoli, 835 
P.2d 162 (Utah 1992), does not prohibit the trial court's order of 
restitution and that recovery is not improper under State v. Pettitf 
698 P.2d 1049 (Or. App.)/ cert, denied, 702 P.2d 1112 (Or. 1985). 
Appellee's brief at 4-6. However, our supreme court's directive in 
Depaoli is authoritative and cannot be circumvented by nonbinding 
case law, a "sister-state" opinion which interpreted text less 
encompassing than the Utah statutes at issue here. 
The Depaoli opinion interpreted two statutes: the 
restitution statute, see Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201, and the defense 
costs statute, see Utah Code Ann. § 77-32a-2. While the Utah 
supreme court analyzed both provisions in Depaoli, the Oregon court 
of appeals only considered the restitution statute in Pettit. 
Compare Depaoli, 835 P.2d at 163, with Pettit, 698 P.2d at 1050-51. 
The Pettit decision is inadequate under its own law and 
under Utah law. Pettit's limited analysis ignored other relevant 
text from Oregon's "Costs" statute, language virtually identical to 
Utah's "Defense Costs" statute and language emphasized by Depaoli. 
Compare Or. Rev. Stat. § 161.665(1)) (limiting costs to "expenses 
specially incurred by the state in prosecuting the defendant") with 
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Utah Code Ann. § 77-32a-2 (emphasis added) ("Costs shall be limited 
to expenses specially incurred by the state or any political 
subdivision thereof in prosecuting the defendant, . . . " ) . 
Oregon courts have interpreted this phrase, "expenses 
specially incurred by the state in prosecuting the defendant[,]" to 
mean "those costs incurred by the state after the defendant has been 
charged with a crime. This is because prosecution does not begin 
until there is a named defendant who has been charged." See State 
v. Depaolif 835 P.2d 162 (Utah 1992) (construing State v. Haynesy 53 
Or. App. 850, 633 P.2d 38 (1981)); Or. Rev. Stat. § 161.665(1). 
State v. Pettitf 698 P.2d 1049 (Or. App. 1985), however, 
not only overlooked its "Costs" statute, it also ignored the 
accompanying interpretation from Haynes. Cf. State v. Thurman, 846 
P.2d 1256, 1269 (Utah 1993) ("stare decisis has equal application 
when one panel of a multi-panel appellate court is faced with a 
prior decision of a different panel"). By contrast, the Utah 
supreme court specifically relied on Haynes and its rationale. 
Depaoli, 835 P.2d at 164. 
Depaoli and Haynes both recognized the limitations placed 
on recoverable costs, regardless of whether they are considered 
ineligible "expenses specially incurred" or nonqualifying "special 
damages."1 "[C]osts of police investigations are not part of costs 
1 In accordance with Depaoli, the interpretation of 
"expenses specially incurred," see Utah Code Ann. § 77-32a-2 (from 
the defense costs statute), should remain consistent with the 
interpretation of "special damages," see Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201 
(from the restitution statute's definition of "pecuniary damages"). 
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of prosecution." Haynes, 633 P.2d 38 cited with approval in 
Depaoli, 835 P.2d at 164. Such costs are not authorized by law. 
Additionally, our [Utah's defense costs] statute 
contains a provision not specifically contained in the 
Oregon statute: 'Costs cannot include attorneys' fees 
of prosecuting attorneys or expenses incurred by the 
prosecution for investigators or witnesses.' 
§ 77-32a-2. Since expenses incurred by the 
prosecution for investigators are not allowed, it 
logically follows that costs of investigation would 
likewise be ineligible for restitution. 
Depaoli, 835 P.2d at 164 (construing Utah Code Ann. § 77-32a-2). 
The additional statutory provision contained in Utah's 
"Defense Costs" statute is still another consideration omitted from 
the Pettit analysis. Yet the most glaring problem with Pettit, 
whose holding has never been accepted by the Oregon supreme court,2 
is that if followed the Oregon court of appeals' decision would 
essentially overrule the Utah supreme court's decision in Depaoli. 
The Depaoli opinion disallowed "expenses incurred by the 
prosecution for investigators" and "costs of investigation." 835 
2 The holding in State v. Pettit, 698 P.2d 1049 (Or. 
App.), cert, denied, 702 P.2d 1112 (Or. 1985), is at odds with State 
v. Dillon, 292 Or. 172, 637 P.2d 602 (1982), the cited Oregon 
supreme court decision. Pettit's "rescission of an illegal 
contract" analysis emphasized recovery and the goal of restoring the 
involved parties to their "status quo ante." Pettit, 698 P.2d 
at 1051. Although the Oregon court of appeals' opinion correctly 
recognized that civil law concepts circumscribe orders of criminal 
restitution, i^d., Pettit's compensatory analysis was not 
substantively consistent with the governing law of the state supreme 
court. "[T]he [restitution] statute's purposes are penal, not 
compensatory. Thus restitution must be understood as an aspect of 
criminal law, not as a quasi-civil recovery device." Dillon, 637 
P.2d at 607 (emphasis added and footnotes omitted). 
-[footnote continued on next page]-
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P.2d at 165. Such unauthorized amounts would encompass the cost of 
"code R" examinations and the money used in "sting" operations. 
Recognition of Pettity however, would authorize the latter cost when 
both expenditures were "incurred by the prosecution in the course of 
the investigation and prior to the time of the filing of the 
criminal information." Depaoli, 835 P.2d at 165. Pettit cannot be 
followed in Utah because of its incomplete and inapposite analysis. 
Utah's statutory authority is more expansive. 
Investigations into drug-related crimes and sexual offenses 
remain a necessary part of law enforcement. However, apart from the 
"first-blush" emotional reaction which justifiably inures from these 
offenses, the mandate by our supreme court remains principled and 
clear. Our high court concluded unanimously that these inherent 
investigatory costs are nonrecoverable and unauthorized under Utah 
law. See Depaoli, 835 P.2d at 164 ("$165 for a code R examination 
of the victim sexually assaulted by defendant" is a nonrecoverable 
investigative cost for the SLCPD); accord People v. Evans, 461 
N.E.2d 634 (111. App. 3 Dist. 1984) ("Where public monies are 
expended in the pursuit of solving crimes, the expenditure is part 
of the investigating agency's normal operating costs. The 
2 -[footnote cont'd]-
Similarly, the State's attempt here to use Pettit as a 
compensatory justification or as a "quasi-civil recovery device" for 
the $240 should be rejected under Utah law. Just as money was 
"taken" (but not "recovered") by police in Depaoli for the code R 
exam, so too are such investigative expenses "taken" (but not 
"recovered") by police here for the "sting" operation. The Depaoli 
decision does not authorize either cost. 
- 5 -
governmental entity conducting an investigation is not therefore 
considered a "victim" to the extent that public monies are so 
expended"); cf. Depaolif 835 P.2d at 164 (citing State v. Martin, 56 
Or. App. 639, 642 P.2d 1196 (1982) ("where the court held that the 
expense of towing the defendant's vehicle from the scene of a rape 
was not a proper item for restitution"); Opening brief of 
Mr. Garcia, page 6 (citing cases). The trial court's sentence 
ordering Mr. Garcia to pay $240 in restitution should be vacated. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Mr. Garcia respectfully requests 
this Court to reverse the trial court's order of restitution. 
SUBMITTED this lh day of August, 1993. 
RONALD SL FlirC jTJINO 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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